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 A “student debt crisis” is rippling across the nation: for the first time, “student 
debt is rising faster than starting salaries for new graduates.”1  With the student-loan 
industry now less restricted than ever, placing approximately $85 billion in loans 
annually, more and more students are being pushed beneath insurmountable piles of 
debt.2  Unlike general unsecured debt, however, discharging student loans has 
become something of a Herculean task for the beloved “honest, but unfortunate 
debtor.”3
 In 1978, Congress enacted section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.4  Section 
523 enumerates types of debts that are “not discharge[able].”5  In particular, 
subparagraph (a)(8) exempts the student loan from discharge.6  Congress did, 
however, provide an exception to this exemption: a student loan will be discharged if 
forcing repayment would beset an “undue hardship” upon the debtor.7  Yet despite its 
merciful intention, Congress failed to define the crucially important term of “undue 
hardship.”8  In an effort to clarify the term, courts have implemented a variety of 
tests, each involving a different method for assessing whether a debtor has sustained 
the “undue hardship” burden.9  Naturally, judicial attempts to interpret the language 
have resulted in inconsistent rulings,10 which is problematic in light of the uniformity 
requirement of the United States Constitution.11
 In In re Davis, the United States District Court for the Western District of New 
York (“District Court”) considered whether Mrs. Davis would suffer undue hardship 
1. See Matthew Reed et al., Project on Student Debt, Student Debt and the Class of 2007, at 
1 (2008), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof2007.pdf; Brendan Hennessy, 
The Partial Discharge of Student Loans: Breaking Apart the All or Nothing Interpretation of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)
(8), 77 Temp. L. Rev. 71 (2004).  See generally Karen Dybis & Michelle Weyenberg, The Hidden Debt 
Crisis, Nat’l Jurist, Nov. 2007, at 23 (discussing student debt for law graduates in particular).
2. Jonathan D. Glater, Education Dept. Criticized as Lax in Policing Loans, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2007, at A1; 
see also Bloomberg News, Firm Is Issued Subpoena in Inquiry on Student Loans, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2007, 
at C4.
3. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); see B.J. Huey, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has 
the Time Finally Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 Tex. Tech 
L. Rev. 89, 116 (2002).
4. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978); Patricia Somers & 
James M. Hollis, Student Loan Discharge Through Bankruptcy, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 457, 474–75 
(1996).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (“A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt . . . unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for [a student loan].”).
6. Id.
7. Id.; Jennifer L. Frattini, Note, The Dischargeability of Student Loans: An Undue Burden?, 17 Bankr. Dev. 
J. 537, 552 (2001).
8. Frattini, supra note 7.
9. See Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 137–41 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 1999) (discussing the Brunner test, Johnson test, Bryant test, Cheesman and Pena tests, totality of the 
circumstances test, and miscellaneous variations).
10. Hennessy, supra note 1, at 71.
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
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if forced to repay her student loan.12  The District Court analyzed Mrs. Davis’s 
situation under the Brunner test, which originated in a 1985 decision of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.13  Finding that Mrs. 
Davis did not satisfy her burden of undue hardship, the District Court accordingly 
reversed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District 
of New York (“Bankruptcy Court”) and reinstated Mrs. Davis’s entire student 
loan.14
 Although section 523(a)(8) was initially created to “rescu[e] the student loan 
program from insolvency, and to prevent[] abuse of the bankruptcy process by 
undeserving student debtors,”15 the legislation’s effect has been considered “contrary 
to the Bankruptcy Act policy of providing the bankrupt with a fresh start,” the 
damage being done to the many “honest, but unfortunate”16 debtors “far exceed[ing] 
any possible benefit.”17  Mrs. Davis is only one debtor, but her facts epitomize the 
reasons underlying our “student debt crisis.”18  Over the past three decades, section 
523(a)(8) has been revised several times.19  Yet, instead of enacting pro-debtor 
legislation, Congress has taken a contrary stance by “progressively ma[king] student 
loans more difficult to discharge.”20  This case comment does not contend that the 
12. Davis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Davis), 373 B.R. 241, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
13. Id. at 245 (citing Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Services Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff ’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987)).
14. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 252.
15. Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 331 B.R. 18, 22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Andresen, 232 
B.R. at 130 (quoting Raymond L. Woodstock, Burden of Proof, Undue Hardship, and Other Arguments for 
the  Student Loan Debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B), 24 J.C. & U.L. 377, 405 (1998))).  Hicks refers 
to graduates “filing for bankruptcy to rid themselves of student loan obligations ‘on the eve of a lucrative 
career.’” (quoting In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 130 (quoting Johnson v. Mo. Baptist Coll., 218 B.R. 449, 
451 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998))); see also Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 
F.3d 433, 436–37 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The dischargeability provision at issue, § 523(a)(8), was enacted to 
prevent indebted college or graduate students from filing for bankruptcy immediately upon graduation, 
thereby absolving themselves of the obligation to repay their student loans.”); Comm’n on the Bankr. 
Laws of the U.S., Report of the Comm’n on the Bankr. Laws of the U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 
93–137, pt. 2, at 140 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Commission Report] (explaining that section 523(a)(8) 
“responds to the rising incidence of consumer bankruptcies of former students motivated primarily to 
avoid payment of educational loan debt”).
16. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
17. Hennessy, supra note 1, at 74 (citation omitted).
18. See Reed, supra note 1.
19. Amanda M. Foster, All or Nothing: Partial Discharge of Student Loans Is Not the Answer to Perceived 
Unfairness of the Undue Hardship Exception, 16 Widener L. J. 1053, 1063 (2007).  After incorporation 
into the Bankruptcy Code via the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Section 523(a)(8) was revised in 
1990, 1998, and once more in 2005.  Id.
20. Craig Peyton Gaumer, Chaos in the Courts: The Meaning of “Undue Hardship” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) and 
the Argument for Establishing a Uniform Federal Standard, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., May 2004, at 8.  Over 
the course of the three revisions to section 523(a)(8), the non-dischargeability period was first extended 
from five years to seven years, then eliminated entirely, leaving the only method of recourse to be the 
burden of proving “undue hardship.”  Id.
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District Court misinterpreted the applicable law, i.e., the Brunner test.  Alternatively, 
this case comment is an attempt at spurring judicial activism.  Congress will not 
change the law.  Our judges, therefore, must begin to interpret it more leniently.  If 
not, the once realistic solution of a “fresh start” will become nothing more than a pro 
se pipe-dream.21
 Mrs. Davis earned her bachelor of arts degree from the State University of New 
York at Fredonia (“SUNY Fredonia”) through the financing of several student 
loans.22  In 1995, six years after her graduation, she consolidated the loan principals 
and accrued interest into a single obligation totaling $11,031.48.23  Although at 
graduation life most likely promised Mrs. Davis a world of opportunity, the next 
decade of Mrs. Davis’s life was filled largely with disappointment.  After marriage to 
Dale Davis on May 7, 1994, Mrs. Davis and her spouse inhabited a “handyman 
special” said to have “serious structural problems” furnished with “used items having 
little or no resale value.”24  Equally as “modest” were the couple’s two automobiles, 
one of which was more than fifteen years old.25  Further hampering their straitened 
circumstances were Mrs. Davis’s long stints of unemployment, mitigated only by the 
“medical treatment [she received] for depression.”26  The most extravagant asset of 
Mrs. Davis’s life, aside from her spouse’s annual salary of $21,000, was a small 
investment account valued at $757.79; possibly savings accrued from her $8000 
annual salary as a part-time activities aide in a nursing home.27  Amid all Mrs. 
Davis’s economic misfortune, the cost of her SUNY Fredonia education continued to 
grow.  By December 2, 2004, the balance of her 1995 consolidated student loan had 
increased nearly three-fold to a total of $29,925.96.28
 Most likely in response to incessant collection efforts,29 Mrs. Davis turned to the 
federal government for relief.  On August 13, 2003, she petitioned for a complete 
discharge of all debts, including her student loan, under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.30
 As In re Brunner was decided before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, the New York courts have adopted the Brunner test as their sole 
21. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1985); Susan 
Thurston, Behind the Numbers: The New Workload of the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts: Fewer Cases, Added 
Paperwork, Increased Need for Customer Service, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., May 2007, at 42, 43 (noting the 
“increase in the percentage of pro se filed cases from pre-BAPCPA days”).
22. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 246.
23. Davis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Davis), 336 B.R. 604, 606 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006).
24. Id. at 606–07.
25. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 246.
26. Id. at 246–47.
27. Id. at 246.
28. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 606.
29. Sewell Chan, An Outcry Rises as Debt Collectors Play Rough, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2006, at A1.
30. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 606.
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method of “undue hardship” assessment.31  Accordingly, Judge Carl L. Bucki, writing 
for the Bankruptcy Court, was obligated to assess Mrs. Davis’s facts under the test. 
“Undue hardship,” as set forth in In re Brunner, is established upon a showing that: 1) 
the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a minimal 
standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; 2) 
additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist 
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and 3) the 
debtor made good faith efforts to repay the loans.32  The debtor must prove each of 
these factors by a preponderance of the evidence.33
 In applying the Brunner test to Mrs. Davis, however, Judge Bucki uncovered a 
“special problem” within the dispute: Mrs. Davis’s facts were “fundamentally 
different” from those considered in In re Brunner.34  Notably, the majority of the 
family income was derived from wages earned by Mrs. Davis’s “non-obligor spouse.”35 
Although precedent instructs courts to consider total household income (i.e., income 
earned by the debtor, the spouse of the debtor (commonly referred to as the “non-
obligor” or “non-debtor” spouse), a parent, or a co-habitant),36 Judge Bucki decided to 
do otherwise.37  Deciding not to consider the “consequences of substantial earnings 
by a non-debtor spouse,”38  Judge Bucki departed from traditional judicial ruling 
under In re Brunner, and instead proffered a truly equitable solution for both Mrs. 
Davis and Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”), the assignee of 
Mrs. Davis’s student loan.  Through practical mathematics, a reasonable repayment 
31. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 245.
32. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
33. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005).
34. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 608.
35. Id.
36. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 248.
37. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 609.
38. Id.  (“The present instance involves a debtor living with her gainfully employed spouse.  But in a 
different case, a minimally employed debtor might reside with parents, siblings, or friends.  Should 
discharge depend upon total household income, when a discharge of [student] loans is allowed to a 
similarly employed and employable debtor who lives alone?  Alternatively, should the court deny a 
discharge because a debtor could have chosen to return to the parental abode?  To what extent should 
the court ever consider the prospects for a marriage that might place the debtor into a household where 
repayment of the student loan would impose a more manageable financial burden?”).
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amount was calculated, resulting in a partial discharge39 “requir[ing] Mrs. Davis to 
pay all that applicable law could force her to repay.”40
 Although Judge Bucki’s Bankruptcy Court decision was equitable, it was not a 
proper application of the current law, i.e., the Brunner test.  Declaring the Bankruptcy 
Court to have “discharged the debt without following the requirements set forth in 
Brunner,” ECMC appealed the decision.41  In reversing Mrs. Davis’s partial discharge, 
the District Court explained how the Brunner test was not followed.42  In regards to 
the first Brunner prong, whether the debtor can maintain a “minimal standard of 
living,” the District Court claimed that “well established case law makes it clear that 
total household income . . . must be considered.”43  Upon establishing the Davis’s total 
household income to be in excess of the annual self-sufficiency wage for two adults,44 
the District Court overruled the Bankruptcy Court and ruled in favor of ECMC, 
holding Mrs. Davis able to repay her loan while maintaining the requisite “minimal 
standard of living.”45
 After stating that total household income should “not only . . . be considered 
with respect to Brunner’s first prong, but is clearly relevant with respect to the entire 
undue hardship analysis,” the District Court noted that the Bankruptcy Court did 
not mention Mr. Davis’s income once throughout their consideration of the second 
Brunner prong.46  The District Court continued by claiming the facts, “as the 
39. Id. at 609–10 (relying on Raimondo v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Services Corp. (In re Raimondo), 183 
B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y., 1995).  For support, Judge Bucki states:
   For purposes of calculating the non-dischargeable balance of the [student] loan, I will 
assume that Mrs. Davis will likely work about 20 more years, until she becomes eligible for 
full social security benefits.  Her [student] loan presently accrues interest at the rate of nine 
percent per annum.  At that rate, payments of $800 per year for 20 years would fully 
amortize a loan of approximately $7400.  In addition, ECMC could attach the debtor’s 
investment account of approximately $750.  In my view, therefore, no undue hardship 
would arise from repayment of the total sum of $8150.
 Id.  For more on partial discharges, see Hennessy, supra note 1.
40. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 610.
41. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 247.
42. Id. (“[The Bankruptcy Court] did not sufficiently consider the strict constraints of presumptive non-
dischargeability established in § 523(a)(8) and expounded in Brunner and its progeny.”).
43. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).  Total household income would include the income of Mr. Davis, $21,000, 
as well as Mrs. Davis, $8000.  Id. at 246.
44. Id. at 249 (The court, as requested by the ECMC, used the Bureau of Labor Statistics self-sufficiency 
wages from the debtor’s county as a guide in determining what is needed to maintain a “minimal 
standard of living.”).
45. Id. at 249.
46. Id.  While the District Court f launts a fourteen-case-long string citation as support for the inclusion of 
total household income, i.e., accounting of the non-debtor spouse’s income, the cases only refer to the 
non-debtor’s income as either “relevant” or “proper to consider,” clearly falling short of determinative. 
Further undermining the District Court’s reasoning is the lack of financial similarity between Mr. and 
Mrs. Davis and the debtor families in each of the cases relied upon.  See id. at 248 (citations omitted). 
Ironically, one of the cases that the District Court relies so heavily upon in their string citation is 
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Bankruptcy Court found them,” did not support a satisfaction of the second Brunner 
prong;47  the 
type of additional circumstances contemplated by Brunner are well beyond 
those hardships that normally accompany any bankruptcy.  The second 
[prong] is, therefore, a “demanding requirement,” and necessitates that a 
“certainty of hopelessness” exists that the debtor will not be able to repay the 
student loans.  Only a debtor with rare circumstances will satisfy this [prong].  
For example, although not exhaustive, a debtor might meet this test if she can 
show “illness, disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the existence of a large 
number of dependents.”48
The District Court held Mrs. Davis’s circumstances not to suffice the requirements 
of the second Brunner prong.
 The District Court mentioned the third Brunner prong only in passing as the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision for a partial discharge was reasoned unwarranted and 
unprecedented.49  In conclusion, the District Court vacated and remanded the 
decision back to the Bankruptcy Court with orders to enter a judgment in favor of 
ECMC, holding the entire amount of the student loan non-dischargeable and 
effectively denying Mrs. Davis any “fresh start” in every sense of the term.50
 Regardless of the District Court’s “ judicially correct” application of the Brunner 
test, the test remains overly restrictive and mechanical.  Examining the test’s three 
prongs illustrates how courts tend to overlook the unique circumstances of each 
particular debtor before the court,51 resulting in denials of discharge, and further 
exacerbating our current “student debt crisis.”  The first prong of the Brunner test 
requires a finding of whether the debtor will be unable to maintain a “‘minimal’ 
standard of living” if forced to repay the loan.52  According to the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, such an inquiry into the debtor’s current 
and future economic capabilities is appropriate.53  However, the moment a numerical 
Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Buchanan, 276 B.R. 744, 752 (N.D.W.Va. 2002), where the 
court deemed the application of the Brunner test “fact intensive.”  See Davis, 373 B.R. at 248 n.8.
47. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 249–50.
48. Id. at 250 (citiations omitted).
49. See id. at 251–52 (“Instead, the partial discharge was given simply upon the ‘practical consideration’ that 
it was all that the creditor could recover . . . under NY law anyway.  This approach is without basis in 
law and is contrary to the requirements of Brunner and its principles as discussed above.”  (citing Penn. 
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 1995))).
50. See id. at 252.
51. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys (In re Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 2004); Scott 
Pashman, Discharge of Student Loan Debt Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8): Reassessing “Undue Hardship” After 
the Elimination of the Seven-Year Exception, 44 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 605, 616 (2001) (arguing the Brunner 
test is too restrictive).
52. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
53. See 1973 Commission Report, supra note 15, at 140.
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definition is assigned to the “minimal standard of living,” as the District Court did,54 
the entire Brunner test is transformed into nothing more than a bare threshold 
analysis;55 one functionally identical to the Bryant test, another method of “undue 
hardship” assessment.56  The Bryant test finds “undue hardship” present if the debtor’s 
gross income is “at, near or below” the federal poverty guidelines.57  Not surprisingly, 
the Bryant test is frequently rejected by courts in light of its overly “objective 
approach”58 and inability to “examine[] . . . the facts and circumstances surrounding” 
the many individual bankruptcies.59  If a debtor happens to be above their federal 
poverty guideline, just as if a debtor fails to prove his or her inability to “maintain a 
minimal standard of living” under the Brunner test, discharge of the student loan is 
not possible, in spite of any extenuating circumstances that may be present.  For the 
same reasons the majority of courts reject the Bryant test, the first prong of the 
Brunner test should be rejected as well.
 The second Brunner prong calls for a showing that the current “state of affairs is 
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student 
loan.”60  At first glance this requirement seems to “resonate with the forward-looking 
nature of the undue hardship analysis.”61  While the debtor must show more than the 
“garden variety” hardship,62 courts have often “stretch[ed] the text of section 523(a)
(8) beyond its logical bounds”63 by insisting on a showing of “‘additional circumstances’ 
that establish a ‘certainty of hopelessness.’”64  This court-imposed “overkill”65 creates 
54. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 607.  Both courts and all parties agreed to use the self-sufficiency wages from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United Stated Department of Labor as a guide: “Without objection 
from the debtor, the court granted ECMC’s request to take judicial notice of self-sufficiency standards 
issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor.”  Id.
55. Hicks, 331 B.R. at 25 (“Each prong must be satisfied before the court proceeds to the next; if any part of 
the test is not satisfied, the inquiry ends.”).
56. Bryant v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1987).
57. In re Bryant, 72 B.R. at 916.
58. Morgan v. U.S. Dep’t of Higher Educ. (In re Morgan), 247 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. D. Ark. 2000).
59. Wegfehrt v. Ohio Student Loan Comm’n (In re Wegfehrt), 10 B.R. 826, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); 
accord In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 304; Crowley v. United States Dep’t of Educ. (In re Crowley), 259 B.R. 361, 
366 (Bankr. D. Mo. 2001); Sarah Edstrom Smith, Should the Eighth Circuit Continue To Be the Loan 
Ranger?  A Look at the Totality of the Circumstances Test for Discharging Student Loans Under the Undue 
Hardship Exception in Bankruptcy, 29 Hamline L. Rev. 601, 618 (2006) (“Commentators have criticized 
the Bryant test for not examining all of the relevant circumstances in undue hardship cases.  Although 
the court can consider extraordinary circumstances, the court generally does not get a full view of the 
circumstances of the debtor.  For this reason, few courts have adopted the Bryant test.”).
60. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
61. Hicks, 331 B.R. at 27; see also 1973 Commission Report, supra note 15, at 140–41.
62. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753.
63. Hicks, 331 B.R. at 28.
64. Id. at 27 (quoting Briscoe v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Briscoe), 16 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
65. Id. at 28.
647
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
an “almost impossible burden to overcome.”66  All that is required by section 523(a)
(8) under the Brunner test is a determination of “whether the debtor has adequate 
resources to repay the loan [while] maintain[ing] a minimum standard of living.”67 
What social benefit is derived in denying the discharge of a debt of a debtor who 
possesses an income insufficient to pay current or future expenses, yet cannot show 
an absolute “certainty of hopelessness?”68  Just as in In re Davis, “the debtor [will] 
remain unable to pay, the student loan [will] remain unpaid,” and the amount owed 
will continue to escalate.69  Such a high burden causes “draconian result[s]” and is “at 
odds with not only the fundamental ‘fresh start’ philosophy underlying the entire 
Bankruptcy Code, but also the history of Section 523(a)(8).”70
 Examining the third Brunner prong in light of the plain language used in section 
523(a)(8) provides additional reason as to why the Brunner test is inherently f lawed.71 
The third and final prong of the Brunner test requires debtors to have made good 
faith efforts in repaying a loan.72  Simple legislative interpretation reveals this 
requirement to be unfounded.  Section 523(a)(8) provides, in part, that “excepting 
such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor’s dependents.”73  The first italicized phrase, “would impose,” indicates that 
Congress intended for the focus of the courts’ inquiry to be on the “ future impact” of 
denying discharge.74  Therefore, however vague the term “undue hardship” is, it must 
carry a definition in line with the statute’s “prospective” considerations.75  Such a 
prospective consideration is further supported by the statute’s instruction to consider 
the impact on the debtor’s dependents.76  For if the debtor’s dependents are to be 
considered, the debtor’s past actions are irrelevant: “visiting the sins of the father . . . 
upon the children [is] a result contrary to the letter of the statute and the spirit of the 
law.”77  Lastly, as general policy instructs the Bankruptcy Code not to concern itself 
with how the debtor came in to bankruptcy, the prospective interpretation of undue 
66. Huey, supra note 3, at 116.
67. Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t. of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 744 n.24 (quoting Salinas v. U.S. Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Salinas), 240 B.R. 305, 315 n.15 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1999)). 
70. Id.
71. See In re Crowley, 259 B.R. at 367.
72. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (emphasis added).
74. In re Crowley, 259 B.R. at 368.
75. Id.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (“[U]nless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would 
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for [a student loan].” (emphasis 
added)).
77. In re Crowley, 259 B.R. at 368.
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hardship “better harmonizes with the overall structure and principles underlying 
section 523 as well as the entire Bankruptcy Code.”78
 Although a majority of circuit courts around the country currently rely on 
Brunner, including the district court that decided In re Davis,79 a different, pro-debtor 
method for assessing undue hardship should be used in its place.  The Eighth Circuit’s 
method for assessing undue hardship, the totality of the circumstances test, should 
be employed instead, as it has often been quoted as better equitably suited for the 
debtor,80 “‘afford[ing] a determination that contextually considers both the debtor’s 
situation and the policies underlying § 523(a)(8)’ and better ‘ensur[ing] an appropriate, 
equitable balance between concern for cases involving extreme abuse and concern for 
the overall fresh start policy.’”81  Under the totality of the circumstances test, 
consideration is given to: “1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future 
financial resources; 2) calculation of the debtor’s and his dependents’ reasonable 
necessary living expenses; and 3) any other relevant facts and circumstances 
surrounding the particular bankruptcy case.”82
 The totality of the circumstances test calls for an inquiry into the debtor’s past 
finances.83  Allowing the totality of the circumstances test to inquire into the debtor’s 
past finances while discounting the Brunner test for the exact same inquiry creates a 
contradiction.  Reconciliation is found, however, upon examination of the motives 
behind the different tests’ pre-spective approaches.84  The Brunner test instructs 
courts to determine whether a debtor’s past actions, with regard to repayment, can be 
classified as “good faith efforts.”85  Not only does such a “moralistic” inquiry distract 
a court from relevant considerations, i.e., “how the debtor’s education, aptitude, and 
effort might enable him or her to repay loans” and “how legislative objectives might 
inform the content of the statute’s language,”86 but it is also given “undue emphasis,” 
as the Brunner test works in a threshold analysis fashion.87
78. Id.  (“[A]s a general policy, the Bankruptcy Code doesn’t concern itself with how a debtor came to be in 
the financial position that made bankruptcy necessary.”).
79. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 312 B.R. 200, 206 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004) (“The 
Brunner test, originated by the Second Circuit, has been adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.”).
80. See Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24; In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 741; Huey, supra note 3, at 106–07 (2002).
81. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 140 (quoting Law v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In re Law), 159 B.R. 287, 292–93 
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1993)).
82. Id. at 139.
83. See id.
84. The term “pre-spective” refers to the tests’ inquiries into a debtor’s past; analogous to the “prospective” 
inquiry required by section 523(a)(8) itself.  See discussion supra p. 647.
85. In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
86. In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 741.
87. Id.  Initial inquiries in threshold analyses are usually given “undue emphasis” due to their objective and 
mechanical nature.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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 The totality of the circumstances test, on the other hand, examines the debtor’s 
past relevant reasons.88  In order to determine “reliable future financ[es],” the totality 
of the circumstances test requires courts to inspect both a debtor’s present and past 
resources.89  The debtor’s past financial responsibility is not subjectively judged as it 
is in the Brunner test, but instead objectively judged, and in passing only, as the 
debtor’s future financial capability is assayed.  For example, the following financials 
are taken into account: average income, assets, and reasonable necessary living 
expenses.90  Depending on an objective assessment of the debtor’s lifestyle, the first 
prong of the totality of the circumstances test will either be satisfied or not.91 
Considering the debtor’s past for any purposes other than those behind the totality of 
the circumstances test is clearly “inappropriate.”92
 The second prong of the totality of the circumstances test is self-explanatory.  A 
“calculation of the debtor’s . . . living expenses” is clearly required if a determination 
concerning repayment capability is to be made.93
 The final prong, consideration of other “facts and circumstances,”94 is what most 
sets the totality of the circumstances test apart from other “undue hardship” 
assessment methods.  Peoples’ lives are “complex,” especially those of debtors.95 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect the courts to utilize a method of assessment that 
accounts for such complexities.  The totality of the circumstances test is that method. 
It accounts for those “facts and circumstances” unique to every bankrupt, one that 
“fairness and equity” require.96
 Already employed by the Eighth Circuit, the totality of the circumstances test 
reasonably assesses undue hardship, instilling equity into an area of legislative 
vagueness currently dominated by the overly “restrictive” nature of the Brunner test.97 
If the District Court had applied the totality of the circumstances test in In re Davis, 
88. Hicks, 331 B.R. at 31 (“[T]he relevance of any particular factor should be clear; if a particular factor 
helps answer that question, it should be given appropriate weight and . . . ‘if a factor cannot be taken 
account of in a principled undue hardship assessment, it should not be considered a material factor at 
all.’” (quoting In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 741)).  Examples of such relevant factors are “the debtor’s income 
and expenses, the debtor’s health, age, education, number of dependents and other personal or family 
circumstances, the amount of the monthly payment required, the impact of the general discharge under 
Chapter 7, and the debtor’s ability to find a higher-paying job, move or cut living expenses.”  Hicks, 331 
B.R. at 31.
89. See In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 139–40 (1999); accord In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 739; In re Crowley, 259 B.R. 
at 365–66; Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24.
90. E.g., In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 745–46; Hicks, 331 B.R. at 33–35.
91. See generally In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 747; Hicks, 331 B.R. at 38.
92. In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 741.
93. Id. at 739.
94. Id.
95. Hicks, 331 B.R. at 31.
96. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003).
97. Id.; see also discussion supra pp. 640–41.
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as opposed to the Brunner test, the likelihood of discharge would have been vastly 
improved.  Mrs. Davis had an annual income of approximately $8000.98  Aside from 
a small investment account totaling $757.79, she owned no significant liquid assets 
or any other property.99  Assuming, arguendo, that non-debtor spousal income should 
be accounted for, Mr. Davis contributed roughly an additional $21,000 to the couple’s 
annual income.100  Thus, giving consideration to “the debtor’s past, present and 
reasonably reliable future financial resources,” as the totality of the circumstances 
test instructs,101 an approximate amount of $30,000 can be estimated for annual 
gross income.102
 The second prong of the totality of the circumstances test requires a “calculation 
of the debtor’s . . . reasonable necessary living expenses.”103  Once again, as found by 
both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, Mr. and Mrs. Davis were living 
in a “handyman special” home and owned only “modest” automobiles.104  Thus, all 
expenses related to these assets, e.g., repairs, utilities, food, upkeep, tax, insurance, 
etc., as well as Mrs. Davis’s medical treatments for depression, would need to be 
totaled.105
 The first two prongs of the totality of the circumstances test are informative, but 
any conclusion drawn without the debtor’s particular schedules is mere speculation, 
far from determinative.  Nevertheless, had the District Court employed the totality 
of the circumstances test, Mrs. Davis’s “facts and circumstances,” e.g., her difficulty 
finding permanent employment, struggle with depression, and approximate twelve 
percent interest rate on her student loans,106 would have realistically afforded her a 
fair opportunity at a “fresh start” by way of analysis under the third prong.107  Recently 
decided cases support this conclusion.
 In In re Kelly, a case decided in 2004 by the United States Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel for the First Circuit, Ms. Kelly, a debtor-graduate of Suffolk University Law 
98. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 246.
99. Id.
100. Id.  Again, the District Court relied on an impressive amount of precedent in deciding total household 
income should be accounted for.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  For the purposes of this 
argument, Mr. Davis shall be assumed to be a “non-debtor spouse.”  If, hypothetically, Mr. Davis’s 
income is not accountable to Mrs. Davis’s student loan obligation, the likelihood of discharge would 
accordingly increase even more.
101. In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 739.
102. The total of Mrs. Davis’s income, her investment account, and her spouse’s income equals a gross 
income of approximately $30,000.
103. In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 739.
104. In re Davis, 373 B.R. at 246.
105. Id. at 247.
106. The approximate interest rate was calculated with a compound interest formula, where the principal 
amount was set at $11,000, the current amount set at $30,000, the amount of time set at nine years, 
compounded annually.
107. In re Kopf, 245 B.R. at 739.
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School in Boston, successfully sustained the “undue hardship” burden under the 
totality of the circumstances test and received a discharge of her student loans.108 
The court reasoned that because she was a forty-one year old mother of one and 
foster parent of two, had a “volatile” income, and received “insufficient” compensation 
from Massachusetts for her foster parent commitments, “requiring . . . [Ms. Kelly] to 
repay over $80,000 in student loans would cause her an undue hardship.”109 
Recognizing the doubtfulness of Ms. Kelly ever repaying such a large sum of money, 
the court discharged four of her student loans, totaling over $63,000.110
 A similar application of the totality of the circumstances test occurred in In re 
Jesperson, a case decided in 2007 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Minnesota.  The debtor, Mr. Jesperson, a forty-three year old recovering 
alcoholic single father of two, managed to accrue $304,463.62 in student debt while 
in the process of obtaining a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from the 
University of Minnesota and a Juris Doctor from Oregon’s Lewis and Clark School 
of Law.111  The court carefully considered the “facts and circumstances” of Mr. 
Jesperson’s life, mainly the immense size of his debt, his support obligations for his 
two children, and his efforts to “maintain . . . sobriety.”112  In concluding Mr. 
Jesperson’s circumstances demanded enough to sustain an undue hardship burden, 
the court understood that repayment of his student loans was not possible.113 
Accordingly, Mr. Jesperson received a complete discharge under section 523(a)(8).114
 Based on In re Kelly and In re Jesperson, if the debtor’s personal circumstances 
dictate a reality in which likelihood of repayment is, for all intents and purposes, nil, 
the student debt will be discharged.  Holding otherwise will create undue hardship 
for the debtor and his or her dependants.  As Judge Bucki writing for the Bankruptcy 
Court stated, “[f]rom all foreseeable perspectives, [Mrs.] Davis will never repay her 
[student] loan in full.”115  This seems obvious considering the facts: while Mrs. Davis 
graduated from SUNY Fredonia more than fifteen years prior, she was still unable to 
find full-time employment, had medical depression, and had an exponentially 
increasing student debt.116  The totality of the circumstances test, rather than the 
Brunner test, would have forced the District Court to recognize and appreciate Mrs. 
108. In re Kelly, 312 B.R. at 203, 209.
109. Id. at 208.
110. Id. at 209.
111. Jesperson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Jesperson), 366 B.R. 908, 910–13 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007), aff ’d, 
No. 05–39651, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84595 (Nov. 14, 2007).  The size of Mr. Jesperson’s debt is most 
likely attributable to its interest accrual over the course of roughly seventeen years.  Despite his struggles, 
Mr. Jesperson passed the Minnesota bar exam on his first attempt in 2002.  Id.
112. Id. at 918.
113. Id. at 917–19.
114. Id. at 919.
115. In re Davis, 336 B.R. at 609.
116. Id. (“Even if ECMC were to garnish her wages to the full extent allowed by law, the loan will negatively 
amortize, and she will retire with an even greater liability than she now owes.”).
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Davis’s unique facts and circumstances, entitling her to the Bankruptcy Code’s 
“overall fresh start policy” while simultaneously protecting against “extreme 
abuse.”117
 Our nation’s courts must recognize the inadequacies surrounding the Brunner 
test, in light of both a basic application of bankruptcy policy, as well as its effects on 
the student loan program and our nation’s debtors.  Only then will it be understood 
that a new method of assessment must be implemented.  Without one, Mrs. Davis 
and the masses of “honest, but unfortunate” debtors she represents will never have a 
fair chance of obtaining the fresh start Congress intended our courts to offer.118
117. In re Andresen, 232 B.R. at 140 (quoting In re Law, 159 B.R. at 292–93).
118. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
